	Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 1 of 33 1 J64WcitC1
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	CITY OF ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN, et al.,
4	Plaintiffs,
5	v. 19 Civ. 2645 (AJN)(KHP)
6	FELIX SATER,
7	et al.,
8	Defendants.
9	Conference
10	New York, N.Y. June 4, 2019
11	2:30 p.m.
12	Before:
	HON. KATHARINE H. PARKER,
13	U.S. Magistrate Judge
14	
15	APPEARANCES
16	BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs
17	BY: MATTHEW L. SCHWARTZ CRAIG A. WENNER
18	
19	TODD & LEVI LLP Attorneys for Defendants Sater, Ridloff,
20	Bayrock Group, Global Habitat Solutions and RRMI-DR BY: DAVID B. ROSENBERG
21	MICHAEL S. HORN
22	Attorney for Defendant Ferrari Holdings
23	
24	
25	
. 11	COUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS P C

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 2 of 33 J64WcitC1

(Case called; appearances noted)

THE COURT: Good afternoon. We are here for an initial case management conference, and you'll see that I scheduled this case at the same time as the pending case that the plaintiffs have against some other defendants. I do believe there is some overlap in the cases so I thought it made sense to schedule the cases together, and we can talk about that overlap today.

First, I guess I'd like to hear from plaintiffs about how you view the claims to overlap and also whether discovery in the pending case can be used in this case.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

As you're aware from reviewing the complaints, there is a degree of factual overlap insofar as this case and the related case that you'll hear next. Both deal with moneys that were stolen in Kazakhstan from our clients and laundered into the United States and in some cases the exact same flow of funds.

Your Honor has put your finger on an issue that we have been discussing amongst all the parties, which is that while certainly there is discovery that will be unique to this case, a lot of it is not. We have spent a long time litigating the other case, collecting documents, in order to prove our claims and demonstrate the movement of money, and so we have been discussing with all of the parties how to efficiently

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 3 of 33

exchange information.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

The impediment, which we are working through, is the protective order that exists in the related case, which contains a provision that the defendants have requested saying that confidential discovery material can be used only in that related case. And let me be clear, as I have been clear to the defendants, we have absolutely honored that provision in the order. We honored that and did not rely on the confidential discovery material in framing our allegations in this case. We, in fact, had a clean team that framed the allegations based solely upon nonconfidential material in the first instance. But having filed the case, we know that if we were the defendants, we would ask for some of the same material and as plaintiffs we would ask for some of the same material, and rather than going again to third parties, some of whom are overseas, we would like to capitalize on the efficiencies of simply producing what we have already collected to the defendants here.

Likewise, we suspect that the defendants in the other case, to the extent that material that is produced from these defendants is responsive to discovery requests to our subpoenas issued in the other case, might want to receive that as a supplementation under our continuing discovery obligations; for example, Triadou served a subpoena on Felix seder. He produced some documents, not a whole lot of documents, and it may be

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 4 of 33 J64WcitC1

that those were all the documents that he has, and that would be fine. But it may be that now that he's a party to the case, he'll conduct a more thorough kind of review and produce documents that are responsive to that subpoena, and we would want to produce those in the interest of completeness.

And so the proposal that we've brought to everyone is let's simply bring everyone under the single order and just change that one provision from "this case" to "these cases" and put a double caption on it. We brought that first to the defendants in the other case, because they were the ones who have designated the material confidential. Mr. Ablyazov had not designated any material confidential.

THE COURT: He didn't produce any documents.

MR. SCHWARTZ: He did not, but he also did not designate his deposition as confidential. There are things that are confidential in his deposition but other parties have made that designation.

THE COURT; OK.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The Khrapunovs have told us that they have no objection to this proposal. Triadou is confirming with their client; they have told us they'll get back to us in the next two days.

What I would propose is, hopefully this could be consent, we can come back to your Honor next week -- again, hopefully with everyone's consent -- but if not, we will make

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 5 of 33 J64WcitC1

the proposal that I just made and you can hear the counterarguments.

THE COURT: OK. Now, in the proposed case management conference, I see that you've discussed ESI, you've written not applicable to an ESI protocol. Why is that? Do you anticipate that there will be other sources of ESI than the sources you tapped for the pending litigation?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I'll defer to Mr. Wenner on this point, but I think that given the nature of the parties to this case, we don't expect there to be complicated ESI issues.

THE COURT: OK.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

MR. WENNER: Your Honor, that's right. If you look at the complaint and the particular defendants in the Sater lawsuit, it's pretty clear with regard to them what questions we will have, what documents we will request. We did not anticipate -- do not anticipate -- that there will be any particular ESI burdens or impediments to getting and collecting those documents. The production from particular plaintiffs -from the defendants we don't anticipate will be voluminous.

THE COURT: How does the scope of the discovery differ? What areas of discovery would plaintiffs be seeking that weren't already covered in the pending case?

The background to how we got to the MR. WENNER: laundering in the United States is the same. The money that funded the company Northern Seas Waterage, that story is the Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 6 of 33 J64WcitC1

same, that narrative.

The defendants in this case entered into a relationship with Ilyas Khrapunov and agreed to help and facilitate particular investments and particular schemes within the United States. Those are the five schemes that we've laid out in the complaint. The Tri-County Mall scheme your Honor will remember, that's the same scheme that's at issue in the main litigation. Three of the other schemes are new. So there will be some discovery on these new particular schemes, but otherwise the source of funding, the general money-laundering scheme and the companies involved are largely the same.

We've seen the introduction of a handful of new companies. Again, these are larger shell companies and companies controlled by these particular defendants. Those will be the subject of discovery.

THE COURT: OK. And in your belief, what is Ferrari Holdings' role in this scheme as opposed to the other defendants' that are named?

MR. WENNER: It's quite simple. They were the broker or facilitated the investment in Tri-County Mall scheme. They received \$1,080,000, I believe, and immediately send half of that back to Daniel Ridloff, another defendant in the case, as a kickback. So they received over a million dollars in illicit funds, put half in their pocket and then turned around and put half in Daniel Ridloff's pocket.

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 7 of 33 J64WcitC1

THE COURT: You're contending that Ferrari retained approximately half a million dollars of money that can be traceable back to your clients.

MR. WENNER: Right. They were unjustly enriched by the million, and they retained ultimately over 500,000.

THE COURT: All right. And you think you'll be able to complete the depositions within a year?

MR. WENNER: Yes, your Honor.

We believe, starting discovery today with the initial conference — we've had lots of experience in the other matter; we hope and do not anticipate that this case will drag on in discovery for the years it has there — we do expect to start immediately with certain discovery that may involve overseas defendants; for example, custodians. For example, we had the opportunity to depose and obtain certain documents from people overseas. The defendants in this case were not present for those depositions. They may want to ask questions. They may need to participate in that discovery. For example, deposition of Ilyas Khrapunov; that would be, I expect, an important request by the defendants in this case.

We would want to start immediately with our day requests, start international discovery, start third-party discovery of banks. All of those things we can start immediately. We wouldn't be looking to depose defendants immediately — that can wait — but we would be asking for

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 8 of 33 J64WcitC1

documents from them to help frame the rest of discovery.

THE COURT: All right. I'd like to hear from the defendants now because I see that defendants are contemplating Rule 12 motions, so I want to hear the basis of those proposed motions, and then I'll let plaintiffs respond to that.

MR. WENNER: I mean I'm happy to hand the podium over.

I just would like to talk for a moment about the proposed discovery plan.

THE COURT: Sure.

2.2

MR. WENNER: The parties, I believe, are in agreement on the dates. There were no disputes. We talked for a moment about ESI.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WENNER: We discussed these issues and proposed the dates, and I think the parties are in agreement on them. The question that will be posed is whether or not, and I believe defendants will make a motion, to stay discovery pending their dispositive motions that you just mentioned.

We think in this case that there would be no reason to delay that. If the discovery starts today, we can start all that third-party discovery, avoid the delays we had in the main action, and none of that will have a direct bearing on the defendants' obligations to produce documents, but their actual productions and collections themselves — for example, as we've seen with Ferrari Holdings — is very narrow and specific.

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 9 of 33

There won't be a burden on them and they would need to overcome and show good cause for the stay, and that would in large part turn on the strength of the motions that they'll explain. And if you look at the complaint in this case, it's very similar to the one in the main action, and that complaint has survived ten or more motions to dismiss. And in this case we don't have the jurisdictional impediments. We don't have the RICO statutory standing problem. Jurisdictional diversity is not in question. We don't have the fraudulent conveyance. So all the complexity and nuance from that federal action is not present here, and it's a fairly straightforward laundering of the money that they were not entitled to.

We'd welcome the opportunity to argue before your Honor the motion to stay, but we expect they'll talk about that now.

THE COURT: OK. Great.

Mr. Rosenberg, I'll hear from you first, since you're representing more of the defendants.

MR. ROSENBERG: Yes, your Honor.

If your Honor would like to hear about the anticipated motion to dismiss, I can address that first.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, we anticipate making a motion to dismiss all of the claims asserted against my defendants, Mr. Sater, Mr. Ridloff, RRMI, Global Habitat

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 10 of 33 J64WcitC1

Solutions and Bayrock Group.

2.2

The basis for the motions to dismiss will be varied among their different claims. There will be failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6).

THE COURT: Speak a little bit louder and slower.

MR. ROSENBERG: The basis for the motions will be varied among the different causes of action. The first basis will be a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

THE COURT: Just a failure to plead sufficient facts?

MR. ROSENBERG: That's correct. On the face of the pleading that the allegations, as pled in the complaint, do not establish a claim under New York law.

THE COURT: Under all of the causes of action.

MR. ROSENBERG: That is for the unjust enrichment claim, that is for the fraud claim and possibly other claims, which we're currently researching.

In addition to failure to state a claim under New York law, we will also be moving to dismiss based on the statute, the claim as being barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. That claim, those claims will also be, including the unjust enrichment claim — that claim will include some of the other claims as well, which we're currently researching.

THE COURT: What do you say about the statute of limitations and how far outside the statute of limitations do

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 11 of 33 J64WcitC1

you think then, by how much time did plaintiffs --

1.7

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, the unjust enrichment claims, your Honor, as you can see from the pleading, all of the allegations which establish that claim occurred back in 2012 and 2013, according to the pleading filed by plaintiff. Unjust enrichment the statute of limitations is three years, so even by the face of plaintiffs' own pleading, those claims are time-barred.

THE COURT: Have you discussed this already with plaintiffs' counsel?

MR. ROSENBERG: We have not.

THE COURT: Have you looked into any tolling arguments or defenses they would have to the statute of limitations?

MR. ROSENBERG: We know that there are issues on the unjust enrichment claims, whether that statute of limitations may apply to either a six-year or three-year statute. Based on the underlying causes of action in this pleading we believe that the three-year statute applies.

THE COURT: Other bases for the motion?

MR. ROSENBERG: Finally, there will be a motion to dismiss based on a release signed by the plaintiffs in this case, and that motion will be based, will be filed only on behalf of defendant Felix Sater, who is the beneficiary of that release.

THE COURT: Are you referring to the release signed in

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 12 of 33 J64WcitC1

an agreement between Arcanum and plaintiff Mr. Sater?

MR. ROSENBERG: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And that's the subject of an arbitration proceeding right now?

MR. ROSENBERG: The arbitration proceeding was commenced in order to collect fees owed to Mr. Sater under a recovery assistance agreement.

THE COURT: But isn't there a dispute as to the enforceability of the release now that there's been an alleged violation of the obligations under the contract?

MR. ROSENBERG: I'm not sure if there's a dispute about the enforceability of the release. There may be a dispute about the enforceability of the fees owed to Mr. Sater, obviously, which is why the arbitration proceeding was commenced.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSENBERG: I don't believe that there's any dispute about the enforceability of that release, which was effective as of the date it was signed.

THE COURT: OK. What was the consideration for that release?

MR. ROSENBERG: The assistance, I assume, provided by Mr. Sater. I mean there is a lot of consideration for that release, which is the subject of the arbitration proceeding. The arbitration panel has just been appointed within the past

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 13 of 33 J64WcitC1

week or two.

. 2

THE COURT: What's the schedule for that arbitration?

MR. ROSENBERG: I'm not exactly privy to the exact

schedule for that arbitration right now, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. ROSENBERG: But it's really just started.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. ROSENBERG: There's been no exchange of documents. The panel was just appointed.

THE COURT: OK. And I see that you also are anticipating a motion related to disqualification of Boies Schiller.

MR. ROSENBERG: Yes, your Honor.

As the pleadings and the facts disclosed in the related proceeding show, Boies Schiller, as counsel for plaintiffs in this action, have a longstanding relationship with Mr. Sater. That relationship commenced in about 2015.

During that relationship Mr. Sater met with plaintiffs' counsel numerous times, exchanged numerous communications with plaintiffs' counsel, and I think as plaintiffs' counsel has said today, many of those discussions were tied to the recovery of assets against the defendants in the related proceeding and touched on possibly the assets and allegations in this case as well.

We don't know the full extent of those communications

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 14 of 33 J64WcitC1

and what exactly was exchanged in those meetings. We don't know what notes or memorandum or other documents might have been exchanged between the parties. We don't know whether plaintiffs' counsel took notes, what was discussed during those meetings.

THE COURT: Your firm wasn't in contact with Moses & Singer about what was going on in those communications?

MR. ROSENBERG: We were not counsel to Mr. Sater in the related proceeding, no.

THE COURT: Well, payments were made to Todd & Levi

MR. ROSENBERG: Yes.

2.2

THE COURT: -- under the Litco agreement,

MR. ROSENBERG: Correct. Todd & Levi LLP had established an escrow account for those payments under the Litco agreement. That's correct.

THE COURT: So you established an escrow account for the payment of fees under the Litco agreement but have no idea why?

MR. ROSENBERG: I didn't say we don't have any idea what happened -- what's going on in this case or with respect to Litco. What I'm saying is that prior to our involvement, Mr. Sater had entered into an agreement with plaintiffs' counsel to provide assistance.

THE COURT: OK.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ROSENBERG: But what I am saying is that Mr. Sater did meet with plaintiffs' counsel and that the subject of those

meetings, was he not?

MR. ROSENBERG: I don't know that, your Honor. Standing here today, I don't know that Mr. Wolf was present at those meetings or not.

THE COURT: And no one from your firm was present at those meetings.

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 16 of 33 J64WcitC1

MR. ROSENBERG: Absolutely not.

1 -

And your Honor, just to clarify, I'm not standing here today saying that, with certainty that plaintiffs' counsel will have a conflict of interest, but what I am saying is that we're entitled to discovery to see what plaintiffs' counsel may have in their files relating to those communications and meetings with Mr. Sater. And if it turns out that that discovery shows that there's a conflict of interest — perhaps plaintiffs' counsel has information or may be called to testify in a way that's adverse to their own client — then there may be a basis for a motion to disqualify.

Again, I don't know that to be a fact, your Honor, but the point is that to the extent plaintiffs' counsel is a fact witness with relevant information, there may be a conflict of interest.

THE COURT: OK. So those are the two motions you're proposing.

MR. ROSENBERG: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And you're also proposing a stay of discovery?

MR. ROSENBERG: I discussed this with counsel to the codefendant. I believe what we were looking for was a stay of discovery only as to the parties; that we would be happy to engage in any third-party discovery because that is going to be extensive and may call on parties in other parts of the world

1.3

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 17 of 33 J64WcitC1

but perhaps a stay of discovery only as to the parties pending the motions to dismiss.

THE COURT: And on what basis should I grant the stay?

MR. ROSENBERG: Only on the basis of judicial

efficiency, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why would it be efficient if you're proposing a year of discovery? My experience with the pending case is that there's a lot of discovery. You're proposing 20 depositions per party, and the three transactions that are unique to this action, I imagine, are going to involve quite a lot of discovery in and of themselves from the parties.

Also, why would I stay party discovery and impose a burden on nonparties? Parties have an obligation to get discovery from each other before imposing discovery on another party.

MR. ROSENBERG: I believe there was a concern that possibly some of these parties may be dismissed as a result of a motion to dismiss earlier than others, and obviously that's pending the filings of the motions both on behalf of my clients, plaintiffs and my clients and as well the codefendants.

THE COURT: Which of the parties you're representing do you believe have the strongest motion to dismiss, or alternatively, do you believe all of them have equal strength?

MR. ROSENBERG: I believe they all have equal

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 18 of 33 J64WcitC1

strength, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROSENBERG: I believe that Mr. Ridloff and RRMI truly have no place in this proceeding and that their motions, perhaps, may be stronger on the failure to state a claim motion, and obviously as to the statute of limitations motion, those apply equally to all of the defendants.

THE COURT: Is your client, Mr. Sater, adverse to the Khrapunovs and to plaintiffs here? As I understand it, you're denying the material allegations.

MR. ROSENBERG: Of course.

THE COURT: And you're denying that Mr. Sater had anything to do with any money laundering. Is that right?

MR. ROSENBERG: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. But you're not denying that he worked with Ilyas Khrapunov in connection with some of these transactions, for example, the Tri-County Mall, right?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ ROSENBERG: I'm not denying that Mr. Sater was involved in the Tri-County Mall project site, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. ROSENBERG: As to the allegations concerning money laundering or fraud or unjust enrichment, all of those claims we obviously deny.

THE COURT: But your client was providing material help to plaintiffs in their suit against Ilyas Khrapunov, was

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 19 of 33 J64WcitC1

he not?

MR. ROSENBERG: He was, your Honor, as part of the assistance agreement.

THE COURT: OK. Are there any other issues that you'd like to raise right now?

MR. ROSENBERG: Not today, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. Very good.

Mr. Horn, I'll hear from you next.

MR. HORN: Your Honor, there's certainly a detailed complaint here; no question about that. A lot of facts in the complaint; no question about that. But when you look specifically at the allegations as to my client, Ferrari Holdings, it's scant. There's not much there, because there couldn't be much there.

The allegations are that my client, Ferrari Holdings, brokered a debt, a debt mortgage deal, trying to find the highest bidder; nothing unusual about that. Brokered this deal, received money from an attorney escrow account at the closing; nothing unusual about that. Took commission and split it; nothing unusual about that. People have bought homes. They see how commissions are split. It's not unusual in an industry where you receive a commission to split it with somebody else.

So the reality of the situation here is that when looking at the complaint as to my client alone, there's just

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 20 of 33 J64WcitC1

2.2

not sufficient facts to support a finding that my client had any intention, let alone knowledge, or even should have known that these moneys were involved in some type of a money-laundering scheme or some type of a fraud, your Honor. And the problem becomes how far do things like this go? How far does our jurisprudence allow somebody to have a claim against a party who's just involved in a business transaction without any proof that there was any belief or reason to believe that the moneys at issue were "tarnished," for lack of a better word? And I think that this is a good case for that.

When you look at, also, the issue of statute of limitations with respect to my client, there's a big question as to -- the first is accrual. When does the statute of limitations accrue in such a case? In terms of money had and received, do we have a claim against even further parties that received this money that may have had no knowledge? And how far do we span that out?

Certainly the transaction that's the head of this, the transaction that was the improper transaction that my client was so far removed from and may have been in another country, was longer than six years ago, and the question is, do we start from that transaction, or do we start from when my client received the money? And I think that in this particular case that we start from that transaction, the initial transaction, because again, based upon the allegations in the complaint,

. 3

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 21 of 33 J64WcitC1

there's no reason for my client to believe that there was anything improper going on here. So my client, based upon the allegations in the complaint, should be seen as a party that doesn't have that specific knowledge, and therefore, there's not a break in that statute of limitations and then creating a new accrual of statute of limitations.

In terms of unjust enrichment, in this particular case it's a three-year statute of limitations because we're talking about a monetary claim, not an equity claim, but even if it's six years, money had and received has a six-year statute of limitations; the question of accrual comes to mind with that.

In terms of the discovery and the scope of discovery, it's really hard for us here to comment on that, because we know that we don't know what was exchanged from the other litigation. Right? So we're sitting here and we're hearing about all these exchanges and how broad the scope was, but we have no idea because there's a confidentiality agreement between the parties, and I under that they're honoring that, and that's fine. But at this point, without seeing that university, we can't comment on what in a broader sense would be needed other than specific to our client because if discovery's not stayed and my client has to participate in discovery, the discovery would also start from the initial chain and then work down, because there has to be, in terms of money had and received, there has to be proof that bad money

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 22 of 33 J64WcitC1

flowed directly to my client, and so that chain would have to be something that we would need discovery on.

I would hope that a substantial amount of that discovery was done in the other case, but I certainly can't say for certain, and plaintiffs' counsel can't even tell me because of the general notions of what he said in court, understandably, because there's a confidentiality order, and we just had received a copy of that and a proposal in court today to expand that to our litigation. Obviously I have to look at it, talk to my client.

THE COURT: Right.

1.

2

3

4

5

. 6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. HORN: I understand that there's another party that's off doing that in the other litigation.

THE COURT: Was your client involved in all five of the alleged schemes?

MR. HORN: No. It's just the mall.

THE COURT: Just the Tri-County Mall?

MR. HORN: That's my understanding, that he was just a broker for that debt.

THE COURT: I see. So the gist of your motion is that there aren't sufficient facts in the complaint indicating that your CLIENT had any knowledge of alleged stolen money.

MR. HORN: Right. And also unjust enrichment requires that, it has to be not too far removed from the initial transaction. This is so far removed from the initial -- from

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 23 of 33 J64WcitC1

the bad transaction that -- again, under certain cases it shows that, I think that there are now --

THE COURT: You mean the initial transaction being the fact of the money --

MR. HORN: The bad --

THE COURT: -- from plaintiffs?

MR. HORN: -- exactly. That it's so far removed, that it should be found -- it's similar to proximate cause. Right? It can't be so far removed that it's outside the scope of reasonableness.

THE COURT: Have you discussed this issue with plaintiffs' counsel, and have they indicated that there's an ability to cure the alleged defect with the pleading as to this issue?

MR. HORN: We discussed the issue of us filing a motion to dismiss. I would like to have further discussions on that and more particular on what we're discussing here, because I would like that as well as I'd like to talk about the issue of tolling the statute of limitations and where there are issues that statute of limitations can be tolled in certain circumstances, and rather than file my motion, get their argument on tolling and then do the research on that and respond, it would be much better to just understand their position on tolling.

THE COURT: Right, because what I'm concerned about is

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 24 of 33 J64WcitC1

having the parties spend a lot of time and effort on motions when some of the issues could be cured by an amended pleading and then perhaps the issues on the motion narrow.

I want to here from plaintiffs, but my thought would be to perhaps give you a short period of time to discuss that and then submit a proposal as to how to go forward on any motion and/or amended pleading.

MR. HORN: Right.

THE COURT: That's all I have to say on that.

MR. HORN: In terms of unjust enrichment also one of the issues is that in order for there to be unjust enrichment my client would have had to not provide services. Right? My client would have had to be unjustly enriched, but my client provided services. My client found this person to purchase this debt, and that's why they achieved — that's why they earned that money.

Anyway, there are certainly issues. The problem with the discovery stay is that, logistically speaking, I like to focus on one thing at a time unless I'm forced to do -- if we're in an expedited situation, that's one thing. Seems like we're not. Discovery's going to be over next year. I mean we're going to have a discussion with them about the motion, we're going to be briefing the motion. Maybe we'll resolve it, maybe we won't. But to have our initial discovery, to have our demands to be sent out and then have responses within probably

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

25

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 25 of 33 J64WcitC1

the time that we're going to have that discussion, to me, it's just a lot to do and it's a lot of money to expend. So we were talking about, we were trying to compromise on this.

We recognize that plaintiffs want to go seek documents outside of this jurisdiction, and we have no problem with that. I have no problem with them, because third parties may not be preserving records. Right? My client, once he knows about a lawsuit, I'm his attorney, he's told to preserve records. Right? Everybody else is, but I understand third parties may not be because they don't know about this case. So I have no problem with them serving a subpoena on these third parties, going to the Hague, going through the Hague Convention, and that takes a tremendous amount of time. But it seems to me that my experience going through the Hague Convention, and depends on the country, but it just takes a very long time and for us to be rushing to get discovery and to resolve this motion and to brief this motion all at the same time when we all know that discovery outside from this country is going to take a long time, and they don't need stuff from my client at least, from my understanding, to serve those subpoenas. They're not looking for documentation from us to serve foreign subpoenas because we have nothing, and even with the allegations, all the allegations, we have nothing to do with anything that was foreign, outside of the country. My client didn't have transactions, from my understanding, outside of

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 26 of 33 J64WcitC1

this country relating to this case.

For that reason, even if discovery is not stayed in whole, let's get a reasonable discovery schedule together, taking into account the good faith efforts that we're going to make to resolve the motion, the possibility of resolving motions or moving forward. We could have a conference call after we've made those, had those discussions, trying to resolve the motion. And then if they're not resolved, we can do a briefing schedule and then party discovery. I think it's going to take some time for the Court to decide the motion, so we can start discovery between that period of time, and if we resolve the motion, we'll have a conference call, then we can start right away with the party discovery. That's my suggestion.

THE COURT: Is there a possibility that your client could have an early settlement with the plaintiffs?

MR. HORN: There's always a possibility to try and resolve a case, and I come with no preconditions and I'd be happy to just have confidential settlement discussions with plaintiffs in any forum if they would like. My client's company is not active now, but they're paying me, so there's some money, and there's a cost going forward, obviously, that we'd also take into consideration.

THE COURT: Right, because if your client's motion isn't granted, there will be a significant expense in the

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 27 of 33 J64WcitC1

litigation.

MR. HORN: Yes.

THE COURT: OK. I'd like to hear from plaintiffs in terms of thoughts about a discovery schedule and the proposed motions.

MR. WENNER: Your Honor, I believe the only question really now is whether to stay discovery. That's the only decision that would necessarily need to be made today.

THE COURT: Well, no. I want to hear your view on my suggestion that the parties be given a brief period of time to talk about the alleged defects in the pleading and whether those alleged defects could be addressed in an amended pleading and the proposed motions narrowed.

MR. WENNER: We absolutely would not want to burden the Court, would not want to burden defendants with motion practice that we would cure with amended pleadings, so I don't think there's any problem with engaging in that discussion with them, identifying defects they may have identified, and we can talk about them, if any. I don't think that's going to be a problem.

I can say, though, that as far as showing good cause for the ultimate merits of the motion to dismiss to make the case go away they ultimately would be unsuccessful.

Taking RRMI and Ferrari just as two examples that have come up here in this conference, just one transaction alone

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 28 of 33 J64WcitC1

allows this case to go forward, and that's in connection with the Tri-County Mall, when Ferrari was paid its finder's fee, that million dollars. What establishes the fraud for notice of a Rule 9 pleading is that they immediately then, the next day, turn around and give half their finder's fee back to the person that they purportedly found as the buyer. They gave this kickback, the 50 percent of their finder's fee, the same day, and that occurred on May 24, 2013 -- and this is paragraphs 203 to 204 in the complaint -- so that's May 2013, and our complaint was filed in March 2019, within six years.

So apart from all questions about equitable tolling, apart from all more nuanced arguments about how we get these other causes of action to go forward, receiving a kickback or providing a kickback, which is RRMI and Ferrari, will allow us to go forward to the merits.

THE COURT: And what about the proposed or potential disqualification motion? That's implicating privileged communications, obviously.

MR. WENNER: It is, and if I understand from the way it was described, I'm not certain that there is going to be a motion to disqualify filed until they've asked for discovery, we've responded, there will be privilege calls, they will get some documents, communications; at that point they can make that decision. But that question about disqualification concerns events that happened long after the allegations in

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 29 of 33 J64WcitC1

this case, going to one question about the scope of the release for Litco to which Sater's not a party, and I don't intend to litigate here all the issues about Litco. But needless to say those events happening in 2015 will have little bearing or impact on the discovery proceeding and the merits of our claims here in this case, and I don't think there will be any conflict-of-interest question with regard to proceeding with discovery on the merits of the case, briefing these issues that predated, and by Mr. Sater's own allegations, he's the one who located Boies Schiller and asked them to involve themselves. So we don't agree with any of Mr. Sater's characterizations about Litco generally, but I think this is not something that the Court needs to tee up today or concern itself with in terms of proceeding to discovery about the allegations in our complaint.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. HORN: Your Honor, if I may just be heard real quickly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HORN: Counsel had mentioned earlier that he was constrained when he wrote the pleading in terms of trying to abided by the confidentiality agreement. I think that we should have some time where we are able to morph whatever confidentiality agreement they have in the other case to our case so that when we talk to plaintiffs about the sufficiency

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 30 of 33 J64WcitC1

of their pleadings, he can tell me, Oh, I found this document, or I have that document, and it shows your client is definitely responsible, because without talking in that with everything that he knows, I think that we could end up with a motion to dismiss and then he somehow is able to try and amend based upon some confidential records, and why go through that.

THE COURT: OK. This is what I'm going to do. I'm going to give the parties two weeks, until June 18, to discuss the overlap of discovery and the joining of the protective order in the pending case, so the parties in both matters can discuss that. By June 18 I'd like a letter as to what the resolution of that issue is and if it's an adoption of that protective order, in whole or in part, you can let me know that and submit the proposed protective order. To the extent that order is more extensive than what is in my individual practices, I will except you from my normal rules so that you don't have to reinvent the wheel.

I will give you then until July 3 to discuss -- I'm assuming there will be agreement on the protective order and that you then will be able to discuss over a two-week period, and even starting before that you can start to talk about some of the statute of limitations issues and some other things you're not otherwise constrained to discuss, so I'll give you until July 3 to talk about whether or not there needs to be an amended pleading and it may be that defendants don't want an

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 31 of 33 J64WcitC1

. 20

amended pleading but you elect not to move to dismiss or you elect to file a partial motion, but why don't you think about that and whether that even makes sense economically for your clients, etc. I'll give you until July 3, and since it's a holiday weekend, you can let me know on July 9 by letter what the parties' plan is. Is there going to be an amended pleading and then a motion? Or will there be no amended pleading and a motion on the existing pleading? And I'd like then a proposed briefing schedule for that motion. OK?

Right now I'm not going to stay discovery. I'm going to adopt the outside deadline of June 4, 2020, and I'm going to wait until I see the various correspondence before determining whether or not any kind of stay is warranted.

In the meantime, I'll ask that you prepare your initial disclosures and to provide those initial disclosures by July 9. To the extent there is nonparty discovery that is not redundant, you couldn't get from a party, you can commence that discovery.

I also would like the parties to think about document requests — not interrogatories, document requests — and to serve those July 9 as well, because I'd like each side to tee up the issues of what are the documents that you would be seeking in this action. And I want to emphasize Rule 34 and Rule 1 so that you are specific in your requests. Do not ask for any and all documents. That is going to raise disputes, so

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 32 of 33 J64WcitC1

I don't expect to see any document requests or "any and all," and objections need to be specific, meaning if something is vague, you need to specify why it is vague, what about it is vague. If the time period is overbroad, you need to explain what is the time period that is not overbroad. So I expect you to be very specific in your requests and responses and to meet and confer in good faith.

And remember, discovery is an iterative process, so that why don't you start specific and then you will have a chance to serve additional document requests that increase the scope. I want you to first start with very specific document requests so you get an idea of what you really need in this action and then you can follow up. OK?

I'm also going to set a conference for July 31.

That's a Wednesday. And we will meet at 11:30 a.m. I'll have received all of the correspondence. We can talk about where we are at that point, and then most likely I'll schedule monthly conferences after that to make sure that the parties are on top of their discovery and to minimize motion practice. OK?

Anything further?

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, if I just may be heard on one more issue?

Under the current stipulation the defendants have until June 19 to answer or move. Is that date now extended beyond the July 9 date that we report to the Court on our

Case 1:19-cv-02645-AJN-KHP Document 46 Filed 06/28/19 Page 33 of 33 J64WcitC1

discussions regarding potential amended pleadings?

THE COURT: Yes. What I'll do is I'll extend right now to July 9 -- actually, I'll extend it to July 31, and we can talk about it at the conference to the extent needed. OK?

Anything else from plaintiffs?

MR. SCHWARTZ: One thing.

There is one defendant that has been served and defaulted quite a while ago. We don't want to leave that loose end out there, but at the same time, we don't want them popping up and unnecessarily spend time defaulting. Does your Honor have a preference as to when we submit the default?

THE COURT: No. I think what you should do is submit it before July 31, and I think that Judge Nathan most likely will address the default motion, although she may refer that to me for an inquest.

Anything further?

MR. HORN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then we're adjourned, and we'll hear the next City of Almaty case.

Why don't the parties come on up.

(Adjourned)